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Abstract 
Background: Substance abusers are characterized by hypersensitivity to reward. This leads 
to maladaptive decisions generally, as well as those on laboratory-based decision-making 
tasks, such as the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). Negative affect has also been shown to disrupt 
the decision-making of healthy individuals, particularly decisions made under uncertainty. 
Neuropsychological theories of learning, including the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH), 
argue this occurs by amplifying affective responses to punishment. In substance abusers, this 
might serve to rebalance their sensitivity to reward with punishment, and improve decision-
making. Methods: Before completing the IGT, 45 heavy and 47 light drinkers were 
randomly assigned to a control condition, or led to believe they had to give a stressful public 
speech. IGT performance was analyzed with the Expectancy-Valence (EV) learning model. 
Working memory and IQ were also assessed. Results: Heavy drinkers made more 
disadvantageous decisions than light drinkers, due to higher attention to gains (versus losses) 
on the IGT. Anticipatory stress increased participants attention to losses, significantly 
improving heavy drinkers decision-making. Conclusions: Anticipatory stress increased 
attention to losses, effectively restoring decision-making deficits in heavy drinkers by 
rebalancing their reward sensitivity with punishment sensitivity. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a large body of evidence linking heavy alcohol use with deficits in adaptive 
decision-making under uncertainty; that is, decision-making when the contingencies are not 
fully known (Bechara, 2005; Bechara et al., 2001; Johnson et al., 2008; Yechiam et al., 
2005). Much of this research has been conducted using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), a 
laboratory-based decision-making task involving decisions under ambiguity, thereby 
mirroring real-life decisions (Bechara et al., 1994). Negative affect has also been shown to 
disrupt IGT decision-making in healthy individuals, but this effect has yet to be investigated 
in heavy drinkers (de Vries et al., 2008; Heilman et al., 2010; Preston et al., 2007). Given the 
key role of negative affect (particularly stress) in promoting alcohol abuse and abstinence 
violation (King et al., 2009; Witkiewitz and Villarroel, 2009), this is an important area of 
study. This is particularly so, given that certain theoretical models predict stress/negative 
affect should actually enhance decision-making (Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Gray and 
McNaughton, 2000); therefore, the impact of stress on decision-making requires clarification. 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the effect of anticipatory stress on 
decision-making in heavy compared to light alcohol users. 
Deficits in adaptive decision-making have been linked to problem alcohol use at 
various points in the addiction cycle. Poor IGT performance has been shown to predict 
later binge-drinking in adolescents (Xiao et al., 2009), as well as treatment outcome in 
alcohol-dependent patients (Bowden-Jones et al., 2005). Detailed investigation into the 
cognitive mechanisms underlying poor decision-making in substance users has implicated 
hypersensitivity to reward coupled with insensitivity to future punishment (Bechara et al., 
2002; Johnson et al., 2008; Lovallo et al., 2006). A similar conclusion has emerged from 
neuroimaging, psychopharmacological, and self-report studies (Christakou et al., 2009; Dawe 
et al., 2004; de Wit and Richards, 2004; Li et al., 2010). On the IGT, hypersensitivity to 
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reward is observed as enhanced affective responses (i.e., skin conductance responses) to 
anticipated and received monetary gains (Bechara et al., 2002). The processing of rewards 
during the IGT has been localized to brain activity within the orbitofrontal, dorsomedial, 
cingulate, and insular cortices (Christakou et al., 2009; Li et al., 2010). Furthermore, 
insensitivity to future punishment is observed by the absence of affective responses prior to 
making a poor decision resulting in a large monetary loss (i.e., absence of warning signals; 
Bechara et al., 2002). There is compelling evidence implicating the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (vmPFC) in this (in)sensitivity to punishment (Bechara et al., 2001; Bechara et al., 
2002; Christakou et al., 2009; Fellows and Farah, 2005). This has led to the proposition that 
addiction is caused (and maintained), in part, by maladaptive decision-making resulting from 
aberrant processing in these brain regions (Bechara, 2005). 
Recently, a number of studies have explored the role of background negative emotion 
in decision-making under uncertainty. It should be noted first that the general term negative 
affect here refers to any aversive/unpleasant emotional state, including anxiety, anger, stress, 
or disgust (Watson et al., 1988). We use the term stress to refer to a specific negative 
affective state originating from a threat/harm facing the organism that is appraised to be 
insurmountable or challenging (Lazarus, 1993). Anticipatory stress refers to stress originating 
from an upcoming stressor. 
de Vries et al. (2008) found that experimentally-induced negative affect (i.e., 
watching a distressing film) increased the number of disadvantageous decisions made during 
the early stages of the IGT. Similarly, Preston et al. (2007) reported poorer decision-making 
in those experiencing anticipatory stress. Again, this was only detected within the early stages 
of the IGT when participants were still making choices under ambiguity. In this study, 
anticipatory stress was induced by leading participants to believe they were about to give a 
public speech on what they disliked about themselves. More recently, Heilman et al. (2010) 
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found that the detrimental effect of negative affect on decision-making could be restored 
through the use of appropriate emotion regulation strategies (e.g., cognitive reappraisal). 
Consistent with this, van den Boss et al. (2009) reported that acute stress only disrupted IGT 
decision-making in those evidencing a high cortisol response to the stressor. 
Theoretical explanations for these disruptive effects on decision-making have tended 
to focus around two themes. The first explains the effect of stress in terms of the distraction it 
may cause in the decision-maker (Miu et al., 2008; Preston et al., 2007). That is, stressed 
participants perform more poorly on the IGT because they are worrying about the upcoming 
aversive event, which taxes working memory resources that would otherwise be devoted to 
the task. This is a plausible explanation given optimal performance on the IGT requires 
adequate working memory resources (Pecchinenda et al., 2006), and worrying does tax these 
resources (Hayes et al., 2008). The second explanation is more biologically-focused. Stress 
produces high background emotion that may consequently drown out task-related affective 
responses, particularly aversive responses, processed in the vmPFC to guide decision-making 
under uncertainty (Christakou et al., 2009; Heilman et al., 2010; Preston et al., 2007; van den 
Bos et al., 2009). This supposition is also plausible given that glucocorticoids and other 
neurochemicals released during high stress have been linked to increased reward sensitivity 
and disruption of prefrontal functioning (Liston et al., 2009; Piazza et al., 1991).  
Such findings appear to contradict predictions made by Bechara and Damasio (2005). 
According to their Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH), background emotion should enhance 
decision-making under certain circumstances. Specifically, background emotion states should 
amplify subsequent emotional responses that are consistent with it, i.e., of similar valence 
(Bechara and Damasio, 2005). In this way, background negative affect caused by stress 
would facilitate the processing of losses during the IGT due to their aversive nature. 
Interestingly, this view is also consistent with Grays (1987; Gray and McNaughton, 2000) 
 5 
neuropsychological model of anxiety, which has recently been incorporated into models of 
substance use (Gullo and Dawe, 2008). According to Gray (1987; Gray and McNaughton, 
2000), anticipating a future threat would sensitize the brains defense system, increasing 
vigilance and sensitivity to punishments generally. That is, anticipatory stress would be 
expected to increase sensitivity to losses on the IGT. While the available evidence appears 
inconsistent with these theories, due consideration of individual differences in baseline 
reward/punishment sensitivity may resolve this conflict.  
Whether stress-induced increases in punishment sensitivity would enhance, rather 
than impair, decision-making likely depends on an individuals baseline sensitivity to reward 
and punishment. In healthy individuals, a stress-induced increase in punishment sensitivity 
could overly bias responding such that decisions are driven solely by avoidance of 
punishments/losses, causing an overall maladaptive response pattern (Busemeyer and Stout, 
2002). This could explain the detrimental effects of negative affect reported in healthy 
individuals (de Vries et al., 2008; Heilman et al., 2010; Preston et al., 2007; van den Bos et 
al., 2009). By contrast, in substance abusers, who are characterized by hypersensitivity to 
reward, a stress-induced increase in punishment sensitivity may restore this motivational 
imbalance and improve decision-making, as predicted by Bechara and Damasio (2005), and 
Gray (1987). 
The aim of the present study was to examine the effect of anticipatory stress on the 
underlying mechanisms involved in the decision-making of heavy versus light alcohol users. 
By analyzing IGT response patterns with the Expectancy-Valence (EV) learning model 
(Busemeyer and Stout, 2002), different explanations for the effect of stress on decision-
making could be compared. The EV model decomposes IGT decision-making into the 
component processes of attention to gains versus losses, attention to recent versus past choice 
outcomes, and the consistency with which future choices are based on past outcomes. The EV 
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model has been particularly useful in exploring the specific cognitive processes disrupted in 
various neuropsychological disorders (Yechiam et al., 2005). No study has yet explored how 
stress affects these component processes. 
According to Bechara and Damasio (2005), and Gray (1987; Gray and McNaughton, 
2000), anticipatory stress will increase attention to losses; thereby, improving the decision-
making of heavy drinkers (who have low baseline attention to losses), but impair that of light 
drinkers (who have more balanced attention to gains and losses). Specifically, non-stressed 
heavy drinkers were hypothesized to attain significantly lower IGT scores than non-stressed 
light drinkers, and this effect would be fully mediated by their lower attention to losses. 
However, there will be no difference in IGT scores or attention to losses between stressed 
heavy and light drinkers. By contrast, if stress drowns out IGT affective responses or 
distracts participants, this will impair decision-making in heavy and light drinkers alike, 
most likely by way of decreasing attention to losses. Specifically, these models hypothesize 
that stressed participants will attain significantly lower IGT scores and attention to losses 
than non-stressed participants, regardless of drinking status. Additionally, the distraction 
model predicts stressed participants will have lower choice consistency and attention to past 
outcomes scores.  
2. Methods 
2.1. Participants 
Ninety-two first-year undergraduates were recruited for the present study and offered 
partial course credit. Sixty-seven (72.8%) were female (M = 21.43 years, SD = 7.42) and 25 
(27.2%) were male (M = 21.49 years, SD = 6.31). Exclusion criteria included a history of 
diagnosed organic brain disease, neurosurgery, psychosis, Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity 
Disorder (ADHD), or head injury resulting in loss of consciousness. All participants were 
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pre-screened with the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT; Saunders et al., 
1993) to determine drinking status. Male and female heavy drinkers were operationalized as 
scoring "8 and "7 on the AUDIT, respectively, indicating the presence of hazardous/harmful 
alcohol use (Babor et al., 2001; Roche and Watt, 1999). Light drinkers were operationalized 
as scoring #6, indicating an absence of hazardous/harmful alcohol use. Thus, males with 
AUDIT scores of 7 were not eligible to participate. However, no screened male scored a 7. 
Nearly all light drinkers (95.7%) reported no binge-drinking over the past three months, or 
less-than-monthly binge-drinking. By contrast, the majority of heavy drinkers reported 
monthly (55.6%) or weekly (26.7%) binge-drinking. All participants provided informed 
consent before taking part in the study. 
2.2. Measures 
 2.2.1. Decision-making. The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara et al., 2001) is a 
computerized task containing four decks of cards (A, B, C, D) in which there are 60 cards 
in each deck. All participants make 100 card selections (5 blocks of 20 trials). Participants are 
not aware in advance how many cards are in each deck or how many selections they will 
have to make. Each deck of cards has a certain overall ratio of reward to punishment in terms 
of play money. Decks A and B generally deliver high immediate gains ($100 on average) 
but larger delayed losses (i.e., result in a net loss). In contrast, decks C and D generally 
deliver small immediate gains ($50 on average), but lower overall losses (i.e., result in a net 
gain). Additionally, the magnitude of net gains/losses across the decks increases over the 
course of the task. In the long run, decks A and B are disadvantageous whereas decks C 
and D are advantageous. Again, participants are not aware of these contingencies before 
commencing the task, but are informed that some decks were worse than others (Bechara et 
al., 2000). Decision-making quality is typically operationalized as a net-score of (C+D 
selections)  (A+B selections). Further details are reported in Bechara et al. (2001). 
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 2.2.2. Working memory. Previous studies suggest that working memory capacity 
influences IGT performance (Pecchinenda et al., 2006). Therefore, backward digit span was 
assessed as a brief measure of working memory capacity. A computer-administered task 
(Mueller, 2007) was employed that involved the presentation of a random series of single-digit 
numbers, 1 second apart, after which the participant had to recall the sequence in reverse order.   
2.2.3. Intelligence may also influence IGT performance (Fishbein et al., 2005). 
Therefore, the National Adult Reading Test: Second Edition (NART) was administered as a 
brief measure of IQ (Nelson and Willison, 1991). This test required participants to pronounce 
50 irregular English words that cannot be pronounced correctly by following conventional 
phonetic structure. The NART has excellent test-retest (.98) and inter-rater reliability (.99), and 
performance is a strong indicator of IQ (Blair and Spreen, 1989; Crawford et al., 1989). 
2.2.4. Negative Affect. The Negative Affect (NA) scale of the Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988) was used as a manipulation check to determine 
whether the stressor increased negative affect, as intended. The PANAS assesses the degree to 
which participants are currently experiencing 10 negative and 10 positive emotions. A high NA 
score reflects a state of distress and anxiousness. The PANAS was developed and validated on 
a large US college sample (Watson et al., 1988). Both scales have been shown to have good 
reliability (NA: $ = .87; PA: $ = .88), and NA correlates highly with measures of anxiety and 
depression (Watson et al., 1988). 
 2.2.5. Drinking Status. The AUDIT (Saunders et al., 1993) is a 10-item self-report 
inventory developed by the World Health Organization. It is more sensitive to 
hazardous/harmful drinking than other commonly used screening tools (Aertgeerts et al., 2001; 
Dawe et al., 2002). The AUDIT was found to have a 6-week test-retest reliability of .88 in a 
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sample of 332 primary care patients (Daeppen et al., 2000), and internal reliability of .83 in a 
sample of 327 Australian college students (Gullo et al., 2010). 
2.3. Procedure  
All participants were pre-screened with the AUDIT in order to assess drinking status 
(i.e., heavy or light drinker). Upon arrival, participants were asked to read briefing material that 
led them to believe the study was investigating the interaction between self-perception, alcohol 
use, and decision-making. After providing informed consent, participants were administered the 
PANAS (Time 1) and NART. Participants were then administered the PANAS again (Time 2). 
Upon completion of the PANAS, the backward digit-span task was administered.  
While completing the computer-administered digit-span task, participants were 
randomly assigned to the Stress or Control Condition. Two separate random allocation 
sequences were generated for heavy and light drinkers with random allocation sequence 
software (Saghaei, 2004) by an independent person (MJG) who had no role in the recruitment, 
enrolment, or testing of participants. Random assignment to the Stress/Control Condition was 
indicated by random permuted blocks of eight (1:1 allocation ratio; Schulz and Grimes, 2002b). 
Sequentially Numbered Opaque Sealed Envelopes (SNOSE) were used to ensure allocation 
concealment (Schulz and Grimes, 2002a). This led to four distinct groups: stressed heavy 
drinkers (n = 23), stressed light drinkers (n = 25), heavy drinker controls (n = 22), and light 
drinkers controls (n = 22). 
After completing the backward digit-span, participants allocated to the Stress Condition 
were told that after completing the IGT they would have to give a speech on what I dislike 
about my body and physical appearance (Preston et al., 2007). The speech had to go for at least 
5 minutes, would be recorded, and then rated by a clinical psychologist for organization, 
articulation, openness, and defensiveness to gauge their personality. The experimenter 
 10 
simultaneously presented a previously obscured video camera on a tripod, plugged the camera 
into the wall, and activated it in front of the participant. The experimenter also tested a 
stopwatch before putting it down on the table in front of the participant. This procedure was 
similar to Preston et al. (2007) and has been shown to reliably increase physiological arousal 
and cortisol levels (Dickerson and Kemeny, 2004). Control participants were simply 
administered the next measure on completion of the backward digit-span.  
 All participants completed another PANAS (Time 3), before being administered the 
IGT. When participants in the Stress Condition had completed the IGT, they were informed 
they were not required to give a speech, but they could if they wished to. No participant elected 
to give the speech. Participants were then debriefed as to the true nature of the experiment. 
2.4. Data Analysis 
As in previous studies, separate analyses were conducted on the learning (block 1  3) 
and performance (block 4  5) phases of the IGT (de Vries et al., 2008; Heilman et al., 2010; 
Preston et al., 2007). This distinction is consistent with Bechara et al.s (1997) report that, on 
average, participants do not develop a conceptual understanding of deck contingencies until 
the 80th trial (range: 60th  90th; i.e., block 4  5). That is, they are making decisions under 
ambiguity up until this point. Similarly, neuroimaging findings suggest it is during the 
learning phase that the somatic marker circuitry is most active (Li et al., 2010). In addition to 
this, separate ANOVAs were conducted on EV cognitive parameters in order to explore how 
stress affected decision-making. 
Expectancy-valence (EV) learning model. The EV model derives three separate 
parameters based on participants trial-by-trial choices/feedback considered crucial to 
decision-making (for details, see Supplementary Material, and Busemeyer and Stout, 2002). 
The attention weight parameter, calculates the degree to which attention to gains or losses 
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influence card selection. Scores range from 0 to 1. A score of 0.5 indicates deck selections 
are made considering both losses and gains equally. Values less than 0.5 signify more 
attention to losses than gains. Values greater than 0.5 reflect greater attention to gains than 
losses (Yechiam et al., 2005).   
  The updating rate parameter reflects the degree to which recent versus past 
information influences deck selection (Busemeyer and Stout, 2002; Yechiam et al., 2005). 
Values range between 0 and 1. Small values indicate the participant takes into consideration 
past outcomes for long periods of time when making deck selections. In contrast, large values 
indicate past outcomes are quickly disregarded, and more recent deck experiences weigh 
strongly on decisions (Yechiam et al., 2007).   
 The choice consistency parameter ranges between -5 and 5. A positive score indicates 
increasing choice consistency over time (i.e., choices rely more on expectancies derived from 
past outcomes). Negative scores indicate choice consistency lowering over time, often a sign 
of non-attendance, boredom, or fatigue (Busemeyer and Stout, 2002). Parameters were 
calculated in MATLAB (MathWorks Inc., 2009) using maximum-likelihood estimation 
(Busemeyer and Stout, 2002). 
3. Results 
3.1. Manipulation Check 
 A 3 (Time) x 2 (Stress Condition) mixed within-between factorial ANOVA was 
conducted to investigate whether the stress task increased NA. This revealed a significant 
main effect for Time (F[2, 180] = 35.16, p < .001, %2 = .28) and Stress Condition (F[1, 90] = 
5.64, p = .02, %2 = .06), which were qualified by a significant interaction, F(2, 180) = 22.46, p 
< .001, %
2 = .20. Post-hoc comparisons revealed, as intended, a significant increase in NA 
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from before being told of the upcoming speech (M = 12.52, SD = 3.43) to after (M = 17.19, 
SD = 5.36) for the Stress group only, t(47) = 7.89, p < .001, dz = 1.14. Furthermore, just 
before starting the IGT (Time 3), stressed participants (M = 17.19, SD = 5.36) reported 
significantly higher NA than controls (M = 12.89, SD = 3.22), t(90) = 4.62, p < .001, d = 
1.00. Eight participants in the Stress Condition (four heavy drinkers, four light drinkers) 
reported no increase in NA after being told of the speech. Therefore, these participants were 
excluded from further analyses (van den Bos et al., 2009). 
3.2. Evaluation of Covariates 
 Table 1 shows baseline characteristics of light and heavy drinkers. Heavy drinkers 
engaged in significantly more hazardous drinking, but did not differ from light drinkers in 
age, gender composition, IQ, working memory, or baseline affect. Similarly, there were no 
differences between the Stress and Control groups on these variables (ps > .05). Furthermore, 
their inclusion as covariates in main analyses did not affect the results, except baseline NA 
when examining IGT learning phase performance. Therefore, it was included as a covariate 
for this analysis. 
3.3. Main Analyses 
 Analyses were performed in SPSS (version 14.0.2, SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL). A 2 x 2 x 
3 (Drinking Status x Stress Condition x IGT Block) ANCOVA was conducted on IGT net-
scores for the learning phase, with baseline negative affect included as a covariate. This 
revealed a significant Block x Baseline NA interaction whereby participants with higher 
baseline NA showed a steeper learning curve, F(2, 164) = 4.13, p = .02, partial %2 = .05. This 
suggests learning did take place. There was also a significant main effect of Drinker Status, 
with light drinkers making more advantageous decisions than heavy drinkers, F(1, 79) = 5.11, 
p = .03, partial %
2 = .06. However, these effects were qualified by a significant three-way 
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interaction, F(2, 158) = 3.40, p = .036, partial %2 = .04. Closer examination revealed stress 
improved the learning of heavy drinkers, in that they made more advantageous decisions 
during Block 2 than heavy drinkers in the Control Condition, F(2, 38) = 6.04, p = .02, partial 
%
2 = .14. As shown in Figure 1, while the decision-making of heavy drinkers was 
significantly poorer than light drinkers in the Control Condition during Block 2 (F(2, 41) = 
7.40, p = .01, partial %2 = .15) and Block 3 (F(2, 41) = 5.70, p = .02, partial %2 = .12), these 
differences disappeared under stress. The ANOVA for the performance phase revealed no 
significant effects. 
 To investigate how stress improved heavy drinkers decision-making during the 
learning phase, 2 x 2 (Drinker Status x Stress Condition) ANOVAs were conducted on the 
EV cognitive parameters. For the attention weight parameter, there was a significant main 
effect of stress (F[1, 80] = 7.63, p = .01, partial %2 = .09), whereby stress increased attention 
to losses. There was also a main effect of Drinking Status (F[1, 80] = 7.44, p = .01, partial %2 
= .09), in which heavy drinkers showed more attention to gains (and less attention to losses) 
than light drinkers. The interaction was not significant, F(1, 80) = 0.14, p = .71, partial %2 = 
.002. As shown in Figure 2, heavy drinkers displayed significantly more attention to gains 
versus losses than light drinkers in the Control condition, t(42) = 2.58, p = .01, d = 0.79. 
However, stress increased heavy drinkers attention to losses such that equal attention was 
now being paid to gains and losses, similar to non-stressed light drinkers, t(39) = 0.02, p = 
.98, d = 0.00. Path analysis was used to test for mediation, in accordance with the joint 
significance test (MacKinnon et al., 2007). This revealed the effects of heavy drinking and 
stress on decision-making were fully-mediated by changes in attention to gains/losses (see 
Figure 3). The ANOVAs conducted on the updating rate and choice consistence parameters 
revealed no significant effects of Stress Condition or Drinker Status (ps > .05). 
4. Discussion 
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 The present study investigated the effect of anticipatory stress on decision-making in 
heavy and light alcohol users, and employed cognitive modeling of decisions to explore the 
nature of this effect. The main finding was that stress restored the decision-making deficits of 
heavy drinkers by increasing attention to losses. In fact, anticipatory stress increased both 
heavy and light drinkers attention to losses, consistent with Bechara and Damasio (2005), 
and Gray (1987; Gray and McNaughton, 2000). This is the first study to investigate the 
impact of anticipatory stress on the decision-making of substance abusers, and the first to 
demonstrate that experimentally increasing punishment sensitivity leads to improved 
decision-making. 
Numerous studies have demonstrated that poor decision-making in substance abusing 
populations is related to reward hypersensitivity (Bechara et al., 2002; Johnson et al., 2008; 
Lovallo et al., 2006). Given that IGT decisions involve the consideration of potential reward 
and punishment, that nature of the task is such that hypersensitivity to one of these outcomes 
comes at the expense of hyposensitivity to the other. This differential sensitivity is reflected 
in the attention weight parameter of the EV model (Busemeyer and Stout, 2002), and studies 
have shown substance abusers score higher on this parameter (Lovallo et al., 2006; Yechiam 
et al., 2005). Our results show that for heavy drinkers characterized by hypersensitivity to 
reward, anticipatory stress rebalances their attention to punishments with attention to 
rewards. For light drinkers, who already possess a balanced sensitivity to rewards and 
punishments, this biases their attention toward losses (at the expense of gains). 
Previous studies with healthy controls have consistently reported a detrimental effect 
of negative affect on IGT decision-making, particularly during the learning phase of the task 
when decisions are being made under uncertainty (de Vries et al., 2008; Heilman et al., 2010; 
Preston et al., 2007; van den Bos et al., 2009). Consistent with this, our results showed the 
same increase in loss sensitivity observed in heavy drinkers. Assuming that our light drinkers 
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are comparable to the healthy individuals recruited in previous studies, our findings suggest 
this detrimental effect may occur by over-sensitizing them to losses. 
While of clear theoretical importance, the extent to which these findings have 
implications for intervention is less clear. At the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, we 
added self-reported negative affect to the model as a mediator of the effect of stress induction 
on attention to gains/losses. This revealed that while stress did predict increased negative 
affect (& = .42, p < .001), affect itself did not predict attention to gains/losses (& = .07, p = 
.45). Rather, it was an additional outcome of the stress induction. This suggests the effect of 
stress on punishment sensitivity was not a result of the conscious experience of negative 
emotion, but rather the underlying neurobehavioral mechanisms proposed by Gray (1987; 
Gray and McNaughton, 2000) and the SMH (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). These results are 
consistent with studies implicating the importance of the vmPFC to learning from punishment 
(Christakou et al., 2009), and theories linking vmPFC hypofunctioning to substance abuse 
(Bechara, 2005; Dawe et al., 2004; Rogers et al., 1999). Based on such findings, any 
intervention that improves vmPFC functioning and/or the processing of punishments in those 
hypersensitive to reward would be expected to improve decision-making deficits seen in 
substance abusers.  
A question for future research is whether the effect observed here can be replicated in 
an alcohol-dependent population, in which general cognitive deficits and comorbid 
psychopathology are common, and may differentially affect stress reactivity and decision-
making (Fishbein et al., 2007; Tiet and Mausbach, 2007). More broadly, the fact that a 
(predominantly female) college sample was recruited should also be taken into account when 
considering the generalizability of our findings. It is also important to emphasize that the 
beneficial effects of stress observed here were confined to decision-making when outcomes 
are not fully known which, while consistent with theory, is somewhat counter-intuitive when 
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viewed in the context of general models of stress and addiction (King et al., 2009; Piazza et 
al., 1991; Witkiewitz and Villarroel, 2009). The effect of stress on decision-making when 
contingencies are explicit may differ. Additionally, whether the same effects would be 
observed in those who have consumed alcohol (or intoxicated) is another important question 
for future research. Future research could also explore IGT decision-making during 
anticipation of the stressful speech versus after having actually confronted the stressor. 
 In summary, this is the first study to investigate the effects of anticipatory stress on 
heavy drinkers decision-making. Anticipatory stress improved the IGT performance of 
heavy drinkers by increasing their sensitivity to losses, effectively rebalancing their 
sensitivity to reward and punishment. Stress also affected light drinkers attention to gains 
versus losses, biasing it toward losses. However, this did not affect their overall decision-
making quality. 
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Figure Legends 
Figure 1. Mean net-scores on the Iowa Gambling Task for heavy and light drinkers in the 
Control and Stress conditions. Errors bars represent standard errors. Blocks 1  3 comprise 
the Learning Phase; Blocks 4  5 comprise the Performance Phase. Unadjusted Learning 
Phase means are reported for consistency. An asterisk (*) indicates a significant difference 
between heavy and light drinkers (p < .05). 
 
Figure 2. Mean attention weight scores on the Iowa Gambling Task for heavy and light 
drinkers in the Control and Stress conditions. Scores above 0.5 indicate relatively greater 
attention to gains; scores below 0.5 indicate relatively greater attention to losses. Errors bars 
represent standard errors. An asterisk (*) indicates a significant difference between heavy and 
light drinkers (p < .05). 
 
Figure 3. Path model of attention to gains/losses as mediator of heavy drinking and stress 
effects on Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) learning phase performance. Maximum-Likelihood 
estimation with bias-corrected bootstrap (2000 samples) confidence intervals was employed. 
Attention to gains/losses significantly, and fully, mediated the effect of heavy drinking 
(standardized indirect effect = -.10; CI95: -.20  -.03) and stress (standardized indirect effect = 
.09; CI95: .02  .19) on IGT net-scores. Model showed very good fit to the data, "
2 (5) = 5.10, 
p = .41, CFI = .998, RMSEA = .015. Standardized path coefficients are presented. Residuals, 
and covariances between Expectancy-Valence parameters, are not shown for clarity of 
exposition. Analysis was performed in AMOS 6.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL). 
**p # .01. 
***p < .001. 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptive data for light (n =43) and heavy (n = 41) drinkers 
 Light Drinkers Heavy Drinkers t (df) p 
Age 22.58 (8.86) 20.76 (5.36) 1.14 (82) .26 
Gendera 33 F / 10 M 31 F / 10 M .02 (1) .90 
AUDIT 2.67 (2.24) 12.66 (4.72) 12.47 (82) < .001 
NART FSIQ 105.82 (5.13) 106.60 (4.43) 0.74 (82) .46 
Backward 
Digitspan 
5.14 (1.34) 5.29 (1.49) 0.50 (82) .62 
Baseline 
Positive Affect 
28.93 (7.80) 26.34 (6.55) 1.64 (82) .10 
Baseline 
Negative Affect 
12.56 (3.07) 12.71 (3.21) 0.22 (82) .83 
Note. AUDIT = Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test; NART FSIQ = National Adult 
Reading Test Full-Scale IQ. 
aGroup differences tested with chi-square test. 
Table 1
Unadjusted Means (Standard Deviations) for Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) Net-Score by 
Drinker Status and Stress Condition 
  Block 
Drinker 
Status 
Stress 
Condition 
1 2 3 4 5 
Light 
Drinkers 
Control -4.91 (6.98) 4.27 (9.45) 6.64 (8.95) 4.00 (9.24) 5.45 (11.70) 
 Stress -1.81 (5.40) 2.76 (6.24) 3.81 (8.96) 4.19 (9.05) 2.10 (11.00) 
Heavy 
Drinkers 
Control -4.27 (7.74) -2.36 (7.08) 1.18 (9.17) 1.91 (12.09) -0.18 (9.64) 
 
 
Stress -4.32 (4.02) 2.74 (6.23) 2.21 (8.97) 1.47 (10.47) 2.00 (12.93) 
 
Note.  Net-scores are calculated as number of advantageous decisions  number of disadvantageous 
decisions. 
Table 2
Figure 1
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Figure 2
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Heavy 
Drinking 
Stress 
Attention 
(to Gains) 
Learning Phase 
IGT net-score 
Updating 
Choice 
Consistency 
.24** 
-.22** 
-.10 
-.06 
-.41*** 
.15 
.17 
Figure 3
Role of Funding Source 
Nothing declared. 
 
Contributors 
Both authors designed the study, wrote the protocol, and managed the literature searches and 
summaries of previous related work. Dr. Gullo undertook the statistical analyses and wrote 
the first draft of the manuscript. Both authors contributed to and have approved the final 
manuscript. 
 
Conflict of Interest 
No conflict declared. 
*Author Disclosures
S1 
 
Supplementary material for Anticipatory stress restores decision-making deficits in heavy 
drinkers by increasing sensitivity to losses by Matthew J. Gullo and Adam Stieger. This 
material supplements but does not replace the content of the peer-reviewed paper published 
in Drug and Alcohol Dependence. 
 
Expectancy-valence (EV) learning model.  
The EV model derives three separate parameters thought to be crucial to decision-
making based on participants’ trial-by-trial feedback (Busemeyer and Stout, 2002).  
 The attention weight parameter (W), calculates the degree to which attention to gains 
or losses influence card selection. The model assumes that after each deck choice a valence of 
overall gains (or losses) is experienced from that selection; represented v(t). The valence of 
outcome is the weighted average of winnings (win) and losses (loss) on a specific trial (t).  
Formally:  
)()1()()( tlossWtWwintv −−= . 
Each participant scores between 0 and 1 on the attention weight parameter (W).  A score of 
0.5 indicates deck selections are made considering both losses and gains equally. Values less 
than 0.5 signify more attention to losses than gains. Finally, values greater than 0.5 reflect 
greater attention to gains than losses (Yechiam et al., 2005).   
  The EV model also assumes that participants generate expectancies of future 
consequences from each deck throughout the IGT. The updating rate parameter, denoted Φ, 
examines the degree to which recent versus past information influences deck selection 
(Busemeyer and Stout, 2002; Yechiam et al., 2005). When a deck choice is made, the 
S2 
 
expectancy for that deck, Ej, is updated as a function of past valences experienced for that 
specific deck.  The recently experienced valence is also updated.  The updating rate 
parameter calculates the degree to which attention to past or recent outcomes are considered 
when making choices. Formally:  
)]1()([)1()( −−+−= tEtvtEtE jjj φ . 
Values for Φ range between 0 and 1. Small values indicate the participant takes into 
consideration past outcomes for long periods of time when making deck selections. That is, 
they remember previous deck experiences which guide their decisions. In contrast, large 
values indicate past outcomes are quickly disregarded, and more recent deck experiences 
weigh strongly on decisions (Yechiam et al., 2007).   
 The EV model postulates that a deck is selected when the expectancy for that deck is 
deemed more advantageous than all others (Busemeyer and Stout, 2002; Yechiam et al., 
2005). Formally: 
[ ]
∑ ⋅
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. 
The variable θ(t) denotes how consistently participants follow expectancies with actual 
selections. As more deck selections are made, choice consistency is expected to increase (i.e., 
choices rely more on expectancies). A power function formalizes this assumption (Busemeyer 
and Stout, 2002):  
ctt )10/()( =θ . 
Values for c, the choice consistency parameter, range between -5 and 5. A positive score 
indicates increasing choice consistency over time. Negative scores indicate choice consistency 
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lowering over time. This is often a sign of non-attendance, boredom, or fatigue (Busemeyer and 
Stout, 2002). 
Evaluation of Expectancy Valence (EV) Parameters 
The fit of the EV model to actual IGT decisions, from which the cognitive parameters 
were derived, was evaluated prior to the main analyses. Specifically, the EV model was 
compared to a baseline statistical model in which deck choices on the IGT were assumed to 
be independently and identically distributed across trials (Busemeyer and Stout, 2002) : 
 
( )3214 1 pppp ++−= , 
 
where p1 is the probability of selecting deck A, p2 is the probability of selecting deck B, and 
so on. The baseline model perfectly reproduces the marginal choice probabilities, pooled 
across trials. Thus, the EV model would only perform better if it can explain how deck 
choices are influenced, over time, by the sequence of trial-by-trial feedback (Busemeyer and 
Stout, 2002).  
The models were compared using the G
2
 statistic, which is the log-likelihood 
difference between the fit of the two models: 
( ).22 baselineEV LLG −=  
Positive values of G
2
 indicate the EV model provides a better fit to the data than the baseline 
model. In this study, the EV model was found to provide a better fit than the baseline model 
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in 72.6% of cases (mean G
2
 = 13.92, SD = 25.78), supporting the use of EV cognitive 
parameters (Busemeyer and Stout, 2002). 
